

*STRATEGIC PARTNER'S ATTRACTIVENESS INDEX FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION.
CAN THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION HEADED BY RUSSIA BECOME
STRATEGIC PARTNER FOR THE EU?*

ÍNDICE DE ATRACTIVIDAD DE SOCIOS ESTRATÉGICOS PARA LA
UNIÓN EUROPEA. ¿PUEDE LA UNIÓN ECONÓMICA EUROASIÁTICA
ENCABEZADA POR RUSIA SER UN SOCIO ESTRATÉGICO PARA LA UE?

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ABSTRACT

Before the Ukrainian conflict the EU-Russian relationships had been developing in the format of Strategic Partnership, and Russia had been considered as one of the 'special ten' to whom a special status of 'strategic partner' was awarded. The 'special ten' are unequal in size, political regimens, resource endowments, economic development, and power status. The main problem of this new concept of European Union Foreign Policy is that there is neither an official definition of strategic partnership nor any common criteria for being chosen as a strategic partner.

It is worth mentioning that Russia at the same time has not only developed the integration with the European Union but has also promoted the integration in the post-Soviet area and as a result the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) has been created. Thus, speaking about the UE-Russian relations we should take into account the new Actor on the international arena, the EEU.

The present paper aims at elaborating Strategic Partner's Attractiveness Index (SPAI) for the EU, using the categorical principal components analysis (CATPCA). This analysis allows us to rank its declared strategic partners and to find out which position Russia and other members of the EEU hold in a rank.

The proposal of the SPAI not only proves that in spite of political crises in EU-Russian relationships Russia continues being its core partner and the EEU is strategically important for the EU, but on the basis of this Index it is also supposed to offer methodology for choosing EU's strategic partners with a view to make its choice more science-based.

Key Words: Strategic Partnership, Strategic Partner, Eurasian Economic Union, EU-Russian relations, Synthetic Index

RESUMEN

Antes del conflicto ucraniano, las relaciones entre la UE y Rusia se habían desarrollado en el formato de Asociación Estratégica, y Rusia había sido considerada como una de las “*special ten*” a las que se otorgaba un estatus especial de “socio estratégico”. Los “*special ten*” son desiguales en tamaño, regímenes políticos, dotaciones de recursos, desarrollo económico y posición de poder. El principal problema de este nuevo concepto de política exterior de la Unión Europea es que no existe una definición oficial de asociación estratégica ni ningún criterio común para ser elegido como socio estratégico.

Vale la pena mencionar que Rusia, al mismo tiempo, no solo ha desarrollado la integración con la Unión Europea, sino que también ha promovido la integración en el área post-soviética y, como resultado, se ha creado la Unión Económica Euroasiática (EEU). Por lo tanto, hablando de las relaciones entre la UE y Rusia, deberíamos tener en cuenta al nuevo actor en el ámbito internacional, la EEU.

El presente documento tiene como objetivo elaborar el Índice de atraktividad del socio estratégico (SPAI) para la UE, utilizando el análisis de componentes principales categóricos. Este análisis nos permite clasificar a sus socios estratégicos declarados y averiguar qué posición tiene Rusia en el ranking y otros miembros de la EEU.

La propuesta del SPAI no solo demuestra que, a pesar de las crisis políticas en las relaciones entre la UE y Rusia, Rusia sigue siendo su socio principal y la EEU es estratégicamente importante para la UE, sino que, sobre la base de este Índice, también debe ofrecer una metodología para la elección de los socios estratégicos de la UE con el fin de hacer su elección más científica.

Palabras clave: Asociación estratégica, Socio estratégico, Unión económica euroasiática, Relaciones UE-Rusia, Índice sintético.

JEL Codes: F02, F15, F50, F55, F59.



1. INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the RF and the EU is of fundamental importance, but it is enormously complex and difficult. Just taking into account the high status of the parties it would be already enough to speak at international level about global political and economic affairs, but that is also complicated by the close geographical proximity.

Before the Ukrainian conflict the EU-Russian relationships had been developing in the format of Strategic Partnership. It is worth mentioning that the partners during their history of collaboration have advanced significantly in different fields. However, their relations can be characterized as unstable due to various political and economic crises that the partners have experienced during their history of relations.

It is worth mentioning that Russia at the same time has not only developed the integration with the European Union but also has promoted the integration in the post-Soviet area and as a result the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) has been created. Thus, speaking about the EU-Russian relations we should take into account the new Actor on the international arena, the EEU.

The main objective of this paper is to elaborate Strategic Partner's Attractiveness Index for the EU that will allow us to rank the countries and to point out which positions Russia and other members of EEU hold in the rank and on the basis of this index to propose the Strategic Partnership between the EU and the EEU taking into account the interdependence of their geopolitical, geostrategic and energy dimensions. The EU and the EEU are neighbours and regardless of their willingness they have to consider each other given that it is impossible to resolve separately such common problems as regional conflicts, terrorism, international crime, illegal emigration and ecological problems among others.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The relation of strategic partnership occupies a special position aside from other types of relations in EU's Foreign Policy. The main problem regarding the EU's conception of strategic partnership is the absence of an official definition of the term (Jain 2008; Renard 2010). Moreover Khandekar (2011) argues that there is not any criteria in the choice of its strategic partners while Biscop

and Renard (2010) believe that there are few established criteria such as the capacity to exert a significant influence on global or regional issues. Franco Hijuelos (2010), Quevedo Flores (2012) stress the importance of sharing common values between the partners. Vahl (2001) besides common interest and values highlights the 'equality of size'. In such a situation Grevi (2010) recommends the EU to define its interest and main objectives while Gratius (2011 a) argues that the EU should take into account the existence of different 'classes' and 'levels' of strategic partners. Another problem is the debates concerning the conception of the multilateral objective and bilateral approach of strategic partnerships. Thus, Gratius (2011 a), Vasconcelos (2010), Grevi (2010) highlight the inherent tension between the multilateral objective and bilateral approach while Biscop and Renard (2010), Bendiek and Kramer (2010) and Quevedo Flores (2012) consider the conception as confusing given that it implies the mixing of partnerships with multilateral institutions, regional groups and individual Actors. Blanco (2016) called strategic partnership "the new joker" in the language of international politics proposing to focus on its functions rather than on the definition of the term.

With regard to conception of strategic partnership between Russia and the EU, Smith and Timmins (2003) and Lavrov (2013) absolutely deny the existence of a real strategic partnership between Russia and the EU and define their relations as a pragmatic partnership. De Wilde and Pellon (2006) argue that the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia is a real challenge. Vahl (2001) recognizes the problem of understanding the strategic partnerships in the case of EU-Russian relations and highlights that Russia strongly emphasizes the necessity of equality between the parts. Lavrov (2013) and Razvan-Alexandu (2015) argue that the EU can't enforce Russia to following EU's norms and should use a special approach for the construction of a positive bilateral relationship. Even though Mogherini F. (2014) announced that Russia is no longer EU's strategic partner and the European Council decided to suspend talks on a new EU-Russian Strategic Partnership Agreement due to the situation in Ukraine, according to Voynikov (2015) the freezing of relations did not mean the cancellation of common projects, who defined the current EU-Russian cooperation as a 'forced strategic partnership' concluding that the partnership between parties continues existing but it is a frozen state.

Speaking about EU-Russian bilateral relations we should take into account the new regional Actor on the Post-Soviet Space, the Eurasian Economic Union. Despite Hartwell (2013), Berres (2014), Kuzmina (2015) and Zagorski (2015) consider the EEU as the most ambitious and the most successful model for regional integration in the post-Soviet area Libman (2007) argues that Russia is not sufficiently strong enough to entice other states to join regional organizations. Grinberg (2013) highlights that for Russia it is difficult to be partner with equal rights. Unfortunately the majority of scientists concur that the EEU is not so much an economic project, but rather a geopolitical one (Kubicek, 2009; Zagorski 2015; Satpayev, 2015; Sivickiy, 2015; Podadera and Garashchuk, 2016).

3. EMPIRICAL BASE OF RESEARCH

While observing the literature relating to our theme we can find a small number of works, which would offer a model or any index of strategic partners related to the relationship between countries. The indicators offered in the debate on strategic partnership do not seem to be convincing (Gratius, 2011). These indicators are the following: the power position of strategic partner; a regional power status; natural partners based on values; particular member states interests; core interests.

The European Strategic Partnerships Observatory (ESPO), launched by FRIDE and the Egmont Institute in 2012, is a policy-oriented, web-based and networked platform. It aims to provide information, analysis and debate on the EU's relations with a selected range of key global and regional partners. The platform offers the base of data with indicators of the EU's strategic partners distributed by categories. The categories offered by ESPO are the following: Economy; Trade and Investments; Demography and Populations; Research, Innovation and Education; Military; Energy, Environment and Resources; Public Perception; Politics and Global Government.

Gupta and Azad (2011) propose the Hierarchy Model for the selection of India's strategic partnership based on Analytic Hierarchy Process. Although the model was elaborated for India, its categories have a common character and partly coincide with categories proposed by ESPO and, consequently, can be used for other countries. The criteria offered by them are the following: Economics; Politics; Defense; Technology; People to People.

It is worth mentioning that unlike Gupta and Azad (2011), in order to avoid the subjectivity of experts' assessments for our research we have chosen the quantitative method of analysis and we are going to select the indicators proposed by ESPO and the indicators offered in the debate on strategic partnership described by Gratius (2011b), and we will add some other indicators related to values of the EU (taking into account the 2003 European Security Strategy, where the EU highlights the strategic partnerships with countries which share EU's norms and values), common historical-cultural roots (taking into account the Declaration of RIO of 1999 about the strategic partnership between the EU and LAC (Latin America and Caribbean), which is based on deep cultural inheritance and common interests and values), absence of discriminating actions between partners (taking into account the negative European-Russian strategic partnership experience), partner's juridical-institutional base (taking into account the neo-institutional approach) and the common border factor.

For elaborating Strategic Partner's Attractiveness Index for the EU first we are going to use the CATPCA (CATegorical Principal Components Analysis). This tool has been developed for the data given mixed measurement level such that nominal, ordinal or numeric which may not have linear relationship with each other (Kemalbay and Korkmazoğlu, 2013).

Thus, this tool will allow us to decrease a number of variables, extract principal components of Strategic Partnership and, consequently, to elaborate the

synthetic index and to rank the partners and find out which place Russia and other countries of the EEU occupy in a rank. Second to point out if there is a synergetic effect of being a regional organization and if the EEU occupies the higher position in a rank than every member has separately

We should admit, that the relevant authors simply propose some factors as a theoretical framework, but until this moment there is not any empirical research. The indicators proposed by the European Strategic Partnerships Observatory (ESPO) merely describe the EU’s strategic partners in the context of its economical, political and social development and their weight at the international and regional stage and common interests with EU. Thus, the originality of our work consists of elaborating the synthetic index on the basis of indicators proposed by ESPO together with some other variables proposed by other authors and our own, using the multi-criteria analysis. Furthermore our research is not limited just by the analysis of EU’s official strategic partners and we are going to investigate 184 countries for our model.

The main hypotheses of our research are the following:

The Factor of the political and economic weight of the partner together with common commercial interests was the main indicator for choosing of EU’s strategic partner

Despite the crises in EU-Russian relations Russia continues being one of the core partner for the UE. The EEU becomes more attractive for the EU as a strategic partner than every its members by separately

The empirical methodology of our research is described in Table 1.

TABLE 1 . EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH

Type of analyses	Quantitative
Techniques	CATPCA
Coverage of research	International
Number of items	About 184 countries and the EEU
Research period	2009-2015
Software	SPSS
Base of date	World Bank, ESPO, Eurostat, Economical and Political Forums

Source: Own elaboration.

4. RESULTS

The CATPCA has a sense just if there is correlation between variables and that is why there is a possibility to reduce the number of variables. Thus, first, we must be sure that there is correlation between our variables. Our relevant results suggest that the correlation between variables does exist.¹

¹ The relevant correlations mentioned in the text are not reported to save space. They are available from the authors upon request.



Second we should decide how much factors would be retained for our model. Our total variance is about 62.2 and we decided to retain the first three dimensions, which are the best according to Cronbach's alpha. George and Mallery (2003) give the following rules of thumb: “_ > .9 – Excellent, _ > .8 – Good, _ > .7 – Acceptable, _ > .6 – Questionable, _ > .5 – Poor, and _ < .5 – Unacceptable” (p. 231). The retained principal components are presented in Table 2.

TABLE 2. TOTAL CRONBACH'S ALPHA BASED ON TOTAL EIGENVALUES

Dimension	Cronbach's Alpha	Explained Variance
		Total % (Eigenvalues)
1	.966	31.88
2	.89	12.86
3	.839	9.28
Total	.987 ^a	54.02

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Sources: Own calculations on the basis of SPSS.

Our three dimensions explain about 54% of total variance. Then we obtained the weights of every variable for every of three dimensions (see Appendix 1).

The first dimension (Factor1) explains the majority of total variance and provides the highest weights in variables, which describe the economic and political position of partner and the core interest with the EU, especially the common commercial interest. But the most remarkable observation is that the variable '*export of energy from the third country to the EU*' has the highest weight. So, we can conclude that the energetic interdependence is significantly important. Although we should not forget, that this interdependence is very sensitive to market condition. Thus, for instance, during the high petrol prices period the partner being the petrol importer becomes more strategic. Nevertheless the market tends to change dramatically, and given that the petrol is non-renewable resource, the EU when selecting its strategic partners should take into account this fact for long-term future even though today the petrol prices are low.

Analysing the second dimension (Factor 2) we can conclude that it describes the common values with EU. Social development, human rights, political regimen are very significant in this component. The third dimension (Factor 3) describes in general terms the development of common juridical-institutional

base with the EU. The geographic proximity and trade with the EU have also significant weight in this component. The results by countries with respect to three components are presented in Appendix 2.

Observing the results we can say that the EU's official strategic partners have high positions and are situated very close to each other only in the first dimension (except South Africa, which is quite far away from the rest of EU's strategic partners) that proves our theory and the fact that the indicators for our research have been chosen correctly. Thus, we should conclude that despite the rhetoric of EU's leaders about human rights the most important criteria for choosing strategic partners was the partner's economic and political weight together with commercial interests. So we can affirm our first hypothesis.

In the second dimension the countries with political stability, democratic regime and high social development have the highest position. We can say that they are EU's spiritual partners.

In the third dimension we can observe that the EU develops the juridical-institutional base with European neighbour countries. The highest positions that countries have with common border and trade with the EU such as Norway and Iceland, potential EU's members like Ukraine and Serbia and countries-neighbours with whom the EU develops the European Neighbourhood Policy such as Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Belarus.

The Strategic Dimension (Factor 1) = $0.892 \times \text{Energy Import to the EU (eur), G27} + 0.879 \times \text{World Bank Vote (\% of all votes)} + 0.865 \times \text{Import from the EU to the country (EUR)} - 0.42 \times \text{Absence of Discriminative Actions, WTO pretensions} - 0.644 \times \text{Perception of the EU according to the country}$.

While the strategic dimension is the most important when the EU decides which strategic partners to choose, it should take into account the common values, the level of development of juridical and institutional base and the geographical proximity. Thus, the other two factors while they are not of such importance, as the case of the first factor, at the same time they make the partner more attractive. Also the EU cannot ignore the common values and needs to develop the juridical-institutional base with the strategic partners; otherwise the conception of strategic partnership runs the risk of turning first into programmatic partnership and then even of transformation into confrontation, as now, we can observe in the EU-Russian relations at international stage. Summarizing, we can conclude that if the EU takes into account just the strategic dimension, in such case we can speak about the scenario of pragmatic conception towards the strategic partnership.

In order to construct Strategic Partner's Attractiveness Index (SPAI) for the EU we give the weight to every component on the basis of total variance as explained. The system of weighing for integration of partial indicators based on the total explained variance for every factor has been already used by many authors in different economic fields (Iglesias et al., 2000).

$$\text{SPAI} = 0.59(F1) + 0.24(F2) + 0.17(F3)$$



The results by countries with respect to Strategic Factor or Strategic Dimension (SD) and Strategic Partner's Attractiveness Index (SPAI) are presented in Table 3.

TABLE 3. TOP 20 OF UE'S STRATEGIC PARTNERS

Rank	Country's name	Strategic Dimension (SD)	Country's name	Strategic partner's attractiveness Index (SPAI)
1	<i>United States</i>	5.500	<i>United States</i>	2.695
2	<i>Japan</i>	4.440	Switzerland	2.539
3	<i>China</i>	3.993	Norway	2.462
4	<i>Canada</i>	3.891	<i>Canada</i>	2.246
5	<i>RUSSIAN FEDERATION</i>	3.793	<i>Japan</i>	2.046
6	Switzerland	3.133	Australia	1.907
7	<i>Brazil</i>	2.668	Iceland	1.819
8	Norway	2.498	<i>RUSSIAN FEDERATION</i>	1.499
9	Australia	2.451	Liechtenstein	1.152
10	<i>India</i>	2.177	Korea Rep.	1.147
11	<i>Korea Rep.</i>	1.952	New Zealand	1.143
12	<i>Mexico</i>	1.705	Hong Kong SAR China	1.117
13	Turkey	1.603	Turkey	1.102
14	Saudi Arabia	1.252	Israel	1.094
15	Hong Kong SAR China	1.229	<i>China</i>	1.082
15	Iceland	1.200	Singapore	1.056
16	Singapore	1.080	<i>Brazil</i>	1.052
17	Israel	.915	Monaco	.987
18	<i>South Africa</i>	.872	Chile	.979
19	Indonesia	.869	<i>Mexico</i>	.903
20	New Zealand	.776	Andorra	.858

Sources: Own calculations.

The results of Table 3 lead to the conclusion that Russia occupies the core position in the rank and enters into the first 10 countries both according to the SD (5th place) and the SPAI (8th place).

In regard to the SPAI, Russia was penalised like China by different common values and political regime that was quiet predictable. Thus we can prove our second hypothesis.

Then the EEU was included in our analysis (see Table 4).

TABLE 4. TOP 10 OF UE'S STRATEGIC PARTNERS (INCLUDING THE EEU)

Rank	Country	SD	Country	SPAI
1	<i>United States</i>	5.198	<i>United States</i>	2.681
2	<i>Japan</i>	4.192	Switzerland	2.510
3	<i>EEU</i>	3.851	<i>Norway</i>	2.457
4	<i>China</i>	3.817	<i>Canada</i>	2.222
5	<i>RUSSIAN FEDERATION</i>	3.665	<i>Japan</i>	2.083
6	<i>Canada</i>	3.657	<i>Australia</i>	1.877
7	<i>Switzerland</i>	2.979	<i>Iceland</i>	1.718
8	<i>Brazil</i>	2.459	<i>EEU</i>	1.529
9	<i>Norway</i>	2.382	<i>RUSSIAN FEDERATION</i>	1.485
10	Australia	2.279	Israel	1.151

Sources: Own calculations.

The results of Table 4 suggest that we can conclude that the EEU improved its position in the SD (Strategic Dimension) and entered in the three EU's most important strategic partners. As for the SPAI (Strategic Partner's Attractiveness Index) despite the EEU improved a little bit its value in general, its position did not change and it continued remaining the 8th position in the rank. It can be explained by the fact that the members of the EEU do not have common values with the EU, they do not have democratic regime and have problems with human rights. Nevertheless we can prove our third hypothesis that the EEU becomes more attractive for the EU as a strategic partner than every its member by separately. The members of the EEU (except Russia) are not strong enough for being the EU's strategic partners but together with Russia they are very important strategically and occupy a core position in the rank.

5. CONCLUSIONS

In this contribution we have elaborated the Strategic Partner's Attractiveness Index (SPAI) for the EU. As you will see, for this purpose the CATPCA was used, allowing us to reduce all data into three separate dimensions. The first dimension is strategic, which explains most of the total explained variance and can be applied absent the other two dimensions if the EU employs a pragmatic approach to strategic partnership.

The results of our research have shown that the three hypotheses have been proved. The EU's 'Special Ten' occupy the highest position and are situated close to each other only in the Strategic Dimension which represents the political and economic weight of each partner together with their common interests, especially those of a commercial nature, with the EU. In this regard, it can be concluded



that despite the EU leaders' rhetoric about the importance of common values, the main indicator in choosing its strategic partners was the partner's economic and political weight together with its commercial interests. Nevertheless, the negative experience of the EU-Russian experiment with strategic partnership can be a good lesson, which proves that real partnerships cannot be based only on common commercial interests in long-term perspectives.

The present research offers an innovative methodology for the election of the EU's strategic partners based on a geo-economic approach, which includes political, economic and geographic indicators. The SPAI aims to make the EU strategic partner choice more science-based and, consequently, its position will become more easily understood and appreciated in the international arena.

In addition, it should be mentioned that in the current situation wherein the new USA administration seems to be drawing back from globalization and liberal values, the EU can no longer totally count on its main traditional partner in building efficient multilateralism. In such a scenario on the international scene, the strategic partnerships with other core players have no choice but to become more up-to-date than ever. In this regard, the right strategic partner choice can offer a viable alternative to the heretofore traditional 'transatlantic relationship'.

Despite the political crises in EU-Russian relations, Russia occupies a high position in the rank. It means that EU-Russian relations remain of high of strategic importance. Although the members of the EEU (excepting Russia) are not attractive as strategic partners for the EU, together with Russia they can become strategically presentable partners. Moreover, the EEU is currently expressing a strong interest in building Free Trade Agreements. In this regard, if Russia and the EU can overcome the current crisis, then the EU and the EEU can combine their efforts to defend Free Trade and Globalization in New Multipolar World Order, effectively countering the USA Policy of Protectionism. Thus, the future lines of research can offer the possibility of establishing the Free Trade Agreement between the EU and the EEU or the renovation of the project of Four Common Spaces from Lisbon to Vladivostok, which was suspended due to the situation in Ukraine, but this time taking into consideration the new architecture of relations due to creation the EEU.

However, we cannot ignore that the strategic partnership is primarily a political decision and regardless of how favourable the economic and other indicators can be, the practical application of strategic partnership depends on political leaders' willingness to do so and to take the right steps.

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APPENDIX 1 . SATURATIONS IN PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS

<i>Strategic Dimension</i>	W	<i>Common Values: social development and stability, human rights and democratic principles</i>	W	<i>Juridical-institutional Common Base and Geographic Proximity</i>	W
	1		2		3
Energy Import to the EU (eur), G27	.892	Average of Political Stability and Absence of Violence	.807	Ranking according to the type of Treaties of Association	.764
World Bank Vote (% of all votes)	.879	Absence of Discriminative Actions, Visas with EU	.747	Common Continent	.652
Import from the EU to the country (EUR)	.865	Transparency / No Corruption	.673	Number of treaties with EU	.618
IMF Vote (% of all votes)	.850	Ranking of Human Development	.657	Common Border with EU, (km)	.602
GDP (in billion \$)	.849	GDP per capita (\$)	.650	EU's Missions on other country	.573
Level of participation in clubs of interests	.849	Country's Export to the UE (EUR)	.639	Treaty of Common Trade with the EU	.534
Membership in Security Council, (times)	.829	Human Rights and Participation Index	.604	Trade with EU Ranking	.522
UN Budget (% of GDP)	.818	Coincidence of Political Regime	.580	Number of Embassies of the EU in country	.518
Summits with Strategic Partners	.772	Economic Freedom Index	.578	European Roots (% of population)	.488
Number of published articles	.760	Prosperity Index	.575	Representation of country in Brussels	.412
Foreign Direct Investments that the country makes in other countries, (million \$)	.757	European Roots (% of population)	.507	Long standing of WTO membership	.376
Shanghai Ranking of the best University	.748	Global Competitiveness Index	.454	Gini Index	.280
Global Presence Ranking	.744	Absence of Discriminative Actions or Sanctions	.359	Perception of the EU according to the country	.277
High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports)	.738	Treaty of Common Trade with the EU	.346	Coincidence of Religion	.261
Number of Embassies of the EU in country	.726	Absence of Discriminative Actions, WTO pretensions	.326	Number of EU's Persons working in embassy	.229
Number of treaties with EU	.725	Coincidence of Religion	.322	Military Expenditure (% of GDP)	.216
Long standing OCDE membership	.719	Common Language	.310	Energy Import to the EU (eur), G27	.199

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Foreign Direct Investments that enter in country, (million \$)	.703	Perception of the EU according to the country	.288	Country's Export to the UE (EUR)	.198
Perception of country according to rest of the world	.700	Long standing OCDE membership	.265	Daily Oil Export	.181
Gold and Money Reserves (million \$)	.699	Common Border with EU, (km)	.257	Import from the EU to the country (EUR)	.171
Trade with EU Ranking	.689	High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports)	.199	Absence of Discriminative Actions, WTO pre-tensions	.154
Aid to third countries (\$)	.677	Aid to third countries (\$)	.178	Ranking of Human Development	.148
Global Competitiveness Index	.672	Common Continent	.116	Economic Freedom Index	.111
Flowout with EU	.661	Investment of the EU to the country (billion EUR)	.073	Population, (number of people)	.109
Representation of country in Brussels	.619	Ranking according to the type of Treaties of Association	.056	Long standing OCDE membership	.071
Prosperity Index	.605	Shangai Ranking of the best University	.041	Number of Erasmus students of all levels	.068
Ranking of Human Development	.594	Foreign Direct Investments that enter in country, (million \$)	.009	Daily Natural Gas Export	.059
Investment of the EU to the country (billion EUR)	.569	Foreign Direct Investments that the country makes in other countries, (million \$)	-.021	Foreign Direct Investments that enter in country, (million \$)	.057
Country's Export to the UE (EUR)	.569	UN Budget (% of GDP)	-.036	Prosperity Index	.045
Transparency / No Corruption	.567	Flowout with EU	-.039	Coincidence of Political Regime	.038
Number of Erasmus students of all levels	.554	Representation of country in Brussels	-.075	Human Rights and Participation Index	.033
Coincidence of Political Regime	.493	Global Presence Ranking	-.085	Investment of the EU to the country (billion EUR)	.024
GDP per capita (\$)	.486	Daily Natural Gas Export	-.102	Global Competitiveness Index	.020
Number of EU's Persons working in embassy	.459	Gold and Money Reserves (million \$)	-.130	Growth of GDP (%)	.003
Economic Freedom Index	.445	Gini Index	-.139	Transparency / No Corruption	-.047
Daily Natural Gas Export	.441	IMF Vote (% of all votes)	-.155	High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports)	-.048
European Roots (% of population)	.411	Energy Import to the EU (eur), C27	-.168	GDP per capita (\$)	-.071

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EU's Missions on other country	.395	Import from the EU to the country (EUR)	-1.78	Membership in Security Council, (times)	-1.183
Daily Oil Export	.389	Population, (number of people)	-1.179	Absence of Discriminative Actions, Visas with EU	-1.192
Treaty of Common Trade with the EU	.357	Number of treaties with EU	-1.190	Global Presence Ranking	-1.196
Population, (number of people)	.343	Level of participation in clubs of interests	-2.09	Average of Political Stability and Absence of Violence	-2.16
Long standing of WTO membership	.324	World Bank Vote (% of all votes)	-2.212	Aid to third countries (\$)	-2.216
Common Border with EU, (km)	.317	Number of published articles	-2.220	Absence of Discriminative Actions or Sanctions	-2.225
Common Continent	.304	Perception of country according to rest of the world	-2.34	Shangai Ranking of the best University	-2.264
Human Rights and Participation Index	.290	Military Expenditure (% of GDP)	-2.43	Perception of country according to rest of the world	-2.268
Absence of Discriminative Actions, Visas with EU	.246	Trade with EU Ranking	-2.45	Flowout with EU	-2.292
Coincidence of Religion	.234	GDP (in billion \$)	-2.46	World Bank Vote (% of all votes)	-3.05
Gini Index	.183	Summits with Strategic Partners	-2.254	Common Language	-3.07
Ranking according to the type of Treaties of Association	.176	Daily Oil Export	-2.255	Foreign Direct Investments that the country makes in other countries, (million \$)	-3.08
Military Expenditure (% of GDP)	.141	Number of Erasmus students of all levels	-2.260	Level of participation in clubs of interests	-3.11
Average of Political Stability and Absence of Violence	.100	Long standing of WTO membership	-2.270	Summits with Strategic Partners	-3.14
Absence of Discriminative Actions or Sanctions	-.036	Number of Embassies of the EU in country	-3.388	Number of published articles	-3.41
Growth of GDP (%)	-.085	Membership in Security Council, (times)	-4.13	Gold and Money Reserves (million \$)	-3.48
Common Language	-.169	Growth of GDP (%)	-5.13	GDP (in billion \$)	-3.65
Absence of Discriminative Actions, WTO pretensions	-.424	EU's Missions on other country	-6.13	IMF Vote (% of all votes)	-3.90
Perception of the EU according to the country	-.644	Number of EU's Persons working in embassy	-7.30	UN Budget (% of GDP)	-4.26

Sources: Own calculations on the basis of SPSS

APPENDIX 2. RANKING OF COUNTRIES WITH RESPECT TO THREE PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS (DIMENSIONS)

Rank	Country's name		Country's name		Country's name		Rank	Country's name		Country's name		Country's name	Country's name	Country's name
	Dimension	1	2	Country's name	2	Country's name		Dimension	1	Country's name	2			
1	United States	5.500	Andorra	2.987	Norway	2.828	93	Madagascar	-393	Mongolia	-060	Australia	-062	3
2	Japan	4.440	Iceland	2.887	Ukraine	2.625	94	Uganda	-411	Peru	-109	Paraguay	-072	
3	China	3.993	Monaco	2.875	Moldova	2.500	95	Seychelles	-428	Ecuador	-110	Yemen Rep.	-088	
4	Canada	3.891	Liechtenstein	2.543	Macedonia FYR	2.491	96	Congo Dem. Rep.	-428	United States	-121	Mauritania	-100	
5	Russian Federation	3.795	New Zealand	2.425	Iceland	2.444	97	Congo Rep.	-452	Guyana	-182	Afghanistan	-109	
6	Switzerland	3.133	Switzerland	2.348	Albania	2.162	98	Puerto Rico	-441	Swaziland	-202	Korea Dem. Rep.	-116	
7	Brazil	2.668	Puerto Rico	2.244	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.145	99	Angola	-449	South Africa	-211	Guinea	-117	
8	Norway	2.498	Norway	2.113	Montenegro	2.101	100	Cabo Verde	-453	Colombia	-219	Gabon	-123	
9	Australia	2.451	San Marino	2.025	Serbia	1.984	101	Cameroon	-453	Mexico	-241	Suriname	-134	
10	India	2.177	Bermuda	2.003	Liechtenstein	1.922	102	Belize	-465	Bolivia	-248	Congo Rep.	-134	
11	Korea Rep.	1.952	Australia	1.980	Georgia	1.868	103	Cambodia	-467	Ukraine	-249	Fiji	-137	
12	Mexico	1.705	Greenland	1.874	Israel	1.855	104	St. Lucia	-472	South Sudan	-263	Niger	-151	
13	Turkey	1.603	Bahamas The	1.826	Turkey	1.808	105	Uzbekistan	-478	Gambia The	-318	Malawi	-152	
14	Saudi Arabia	1.252	American Samoa	1.825	Morocco	1.798	106	Turkmenistan	-485	Lebanon	-325	Barbados	-152	
15	Hong Kong SAR China	1.229	Hong Kong SAR China	1.808	Monaco	1.652	107	Guyana	-495	Saudi Arabia	-332	Guyana	-189	
16	Iceland	1.200	Isle of Man	1.665	Azerbaijan	1.575	108	Kyrgyz Republic	-500	Zambia	-356	Chad	-195	
17	Singapore	1.080	Macao SAR China	1.639	Kazakhstan	1.528	109	Suriname	-504	Jordan	-354	Hong Kong SAR China	-239	
18	Israel	.915	Singapore	1.639	Belarus	1.524	110	Swaziland	-514	Thailand	-378	Mexico	-246	
19	South Africa	.872	Turks and Caicos Islands	1.577	Chile	1.509	111	Fiji	-517	Solomon Islands	-378	Swaziland	-282	
20	Indonesia	.869	Faeroe Islands	1.538	Armenia	1.465	112	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	-518	Lao PDR	-386	Benin	-286	

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21	New Zealand	.776	Northern Mariana Islands	1.530	Jordan	1.394	113	Cote d'Ivoire	-.522	Kazakhstan	-.402	Cabo Verde	-.297
22	Chile	.711	Aruba	1.529	Tunisia	1.375	114	Equatorial Guinea	-.532	Azerbaijan	-.433	Togo	-.305
23	Argentina	.659	Guam	1.518	Egypt Arab Rep.	1.138	115	Mozambique	-.535	Gabon	-.440	Turkmenistan	-.321
24	United Arab Emirates	.621	Barbados	1.467	Colombia	1.032	116	Papua New Guinea	-.555	Sri Lanka	-.446	Mali	-.325
25	Ukraine	.573	Virgin Islands (U.S.)	1.430	Andorra	1.032	117	Dominica	-.555	Cuba	-.448	Burkina Faso	-.325
26	Malaysia	.435	St. Lucia	1.396	Lebanon	1.010	118	Macao SAR China	-.565	Philippines	-.458	Rwanda	-.338
27	Oatar	.423	French Polynesia	1.385	Syrian Arab Republic	.995	119	Benin	-.569	Kyrgyz Republic	-.478	Saudi Arabia	-.350
28	Uruguay	.396	St. Martin (French part)	1.353	Vietnam	.959	120	Niger	-.576	Timor-Leste	-.479	San Marino	-.377
29	Serbia	.392	Grenada	1.347	Algeria	.928	121	Nepal	-.579	Benin	-.481	Burundi	-.397
30	Liechtenstein	.359	Sint Maarten (Dutch part)	1.309	Argentina	.921	122	San Marino	-.593	Rwanda	-.491	Liberia	-.404
31	Montenegro	.295	St. Kitts and Nevis	1.299	Switzerland	.769	123	Guinea	-.598	Turkmenistan	-.497	Sierra Leone	-.416
32	Colombia	.258	Curacao	1.267	Ecuador	.761	124	Lesotho	-.599	Venezuela RB	-.508	Central African Republic	-.472
33	Algeria	.258	New Caledonia	1.264	Iraq	.753	125	Mauritania	-.600	Morocco	-.508	Russian Federation	-.502
34	Nigeria	.257	Chile	1.258	Peru	.732	126	Antigua and Barbuda	-.601	Ghana	-.529	Timor-Leste	-.506
35	Albania	.256	Brunei Darussalam	1.223	Pakistan	.654	127	Rwanda	-.608	Tunisia	-.583	Seychelles	-.513
36	Macedonia FYR	.255	Costa Rica	1.216	Thailand	.605	128	Sudan	-.624	Malawi	-.598	Dominica	-.518
37	Egypt Arab Rep.	.254	Montenegro	1.206	New Zealand	.602	129	St. Martin (French part)	-.637	Korea Dem. Rep.	-.607	Guinea-Bissau	-.522

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38	Kazakhstan	.251	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	1.203	Bangladesh	.587	130	Liberia	-.638	Cambodia	-.618	Myanmar	-.536
39	Morocco	.210	Palau	1.163	Kenya	.580	131	Mali	-.639	Turkey	-.626	Bahamas The	-.541
40	Moldova	.206	Cayman Islands	1.156	Uruguay	.570	132	Greenland	-.640	Haiti	-.665	Haiti	-.545
41	Kuwait	.191	Antigua and Barbuda	1.138	Philippines	.569	133	Togo	-.641	Madagascar	-.668	Brunei Darus-salam	-.553
42	Bosnia and Herzegovina	.150	Samoa	1.078	Malaysia	.544	134	Timor-Leste	-.644	Somalia	-.683	Sao Tome and Principe	-.595
43	Georgia	.141	Israel	.989	Costa Rica	.494	135	Tajikistan	-.647	Tanzania	-.689	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	-.598
44	Costa Rica	.141	Tuvalu	.953	South Africa	.482	136	Malawi	-.649	Uzbekistan	-.689	Tonga	-.604
45	Tunisia	.124	Dominica	.911	Kyrgyz Republic	.421	137	Tonga	-.661	Comoros	-.692	Equatorial Guinea	-.605
46	Thailand	.112	Panama	.887	Libya	.417	138	Burkina Faso	-.672	Algeria	-.725	Maldives	-.606
47	Belarus	.091	Seychelles	.879	Dominican Republic	.352	139	St. Kitts and Nevis	-.677	Mali	-.730	St. Lucia	-.622
48	Jordan	.058	Canada	.869	Nicaragua	.350	140	Zimbabwe	-.681	Tajikistan	-.743	Korea Rep.	-.623
49	Libya	.024	Uruguay	.838	Nigeria	.348	141	Grenada	-.686	Burkina Faso	-.755	Djibouti	-.624
50	Monaco	.022	Marshall Islands	.832	Bolivia	.318	142	Cayman Islands	-.706	Congo Rep.	-.769	Lao PDR	-.634
51	Peru	.022	Vanuatu	.769	Cote d'Ivoire	.309	143	Lao PDR	-.709	Djibouti	-.770	Bhutan	-.772
52	Mauritius	.017	Albania	.706	Honduras	.289	144	West Bank and Gaza	-.711	Uganda	-.783	Gambia The	-.777
53	Panama	-.013	Trinidad and Tobago	.699	Sri Lanka	.282	145	Sao Tome and Principe	-.716	Papua New Guinea	-.813	Comoros	-.791
54	Iran Islamic Rep.	-.016	Qatar	.663	United Arab Emirates	.274	146	Faeroe Islands	-.725	Senegal	-.840	Antigua and Barbuda	-.792
55	Venezuela RB	-.017	El Salvador	.647	Venezuela RB	.266	147	Maldives	-.728	Liberia	-.847	West Bank and Gaza	-.874
56	Philippines	-.035	Cabo Verde	.643	Congo Dem. Rep.	.263	148	Bermuda	-.735	Vietnam	-.881	Eritrea	-.937
57	Vietnam	-.045	Kuwait	.637	Panama	.242	149	Vanuatu	-.735	Togo	-.893	Solomon Islands	-.945

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58	Azerbaijan	-.061		Mauritius	.626	El Salvador	.233	150	Bhutan	-.748		Guinea-Bissau	-.930	St. Kitts and Nevis	-.970
59	Andorra	-.062		Suriname	.598	Nepal	.225	151	Korea Dem. Rep.	-.751		Eritrea	-.935	Grenada	-.986
60	Oman	-.063		Belize	.592	Madagascar	.223	152	Yemen Rep.	-.755		Kenya	-.946	Vanuatu	-.1.049
61	Pakistan	-.085		Macedonia FYR	.585	Mauritius	-.182	153	Isle of Man	-.760		Burundi	-.974	Somalia	-.1.079
62	Armenia	-.091		Micronesia Fed. Ss.	.577	Oman	.179	154	Guinea-Bissau	-.764		Mozambique	-.984	Samoa	-.1.254
63	Trinidad and Tobago	-.097		West Bank and Gaza	.570	Kuwait	.176	155	Afghanistan	-.768		Iran Islamic Rep.	-.994	South Sudan	-.1.262
64	Lebanon	-.104		Guatemala	.519	Tajikistan	.163	156	Djibouti	-.776		Central African Republic	-.1.013	India	-.1.278
65	Cuba	-.130		Botswana	.462	Indonesia	.156	157	New Caledonia	-.776		Libya	-.1.027	Marshall Islands	-.1.375
66	Barbados	-.131		United Arab Emirates	.452	Singapore	.156	158	Aruba	-.787		Nepal	-.1.038	Macao SAR China	-.1.410
67	Bahrain	-.153		Bahrain	.444	Qatar	.154	159	Gambia The	-.787		Brazil	-.1.047	St. Martin (French part)	-.1.415
68	Dominican Republic	-.155		Korea Rep.	.441	Namibia	.148	160	Sierra Leone	-.787		Indonesia	-.1.055	Canada	-.1.471
69	Sri Lanka	-.167		Serbia	.416	Angola	.147	161	Samoa	-.792		Sierra Leone	-.1.059	Kiribati	-.1.471
70	Kenya	-.181		Kiribati	.415	Botswana	-.144	162	Marshall Islands	-.810		Cameroon	-.1.089	Isle of Man	-.1.510
71	Brunei Darussalam	-.188		Argentina	.399	Cuba	.133	163	Myanmar	-.810		Niger	-.1.095	Brazil	-.1.551
72	Botswana	-.191		Oman	.346	Iran Islamic Rep.	.126	164	Haiti	-.819		Yemen Rep.	-.1.131	Micronesia Fed. Ss.	-.1.553
73	Ecuador	-.193		Jamaica	.289	Ethiopia	.122	165	Central African Republic	-.831		Angola	-.1.189	Palau	-.1.570
74	Namibia	-.198		Bosnia and Herzegovina	.246	Belize	.119	166	Palau	-.845		Egypt Arab Rep.	-.1.193	Aruba	-.1.574
75	Iraq	-.215		Tonga	.240	Guatemala	-.116	167	Solomon Islands	-.854		Mauritania	-.1.196	Puerto Rico	-.1.622
76	Bangladesh	-.218		Namibia	.209	Jamaica	-.101	168	Burundi	-.862		Myanmar	-.1.197	New Caledonia	-.1.648
77	Syrian Arab Republic	-.218		Equatorial Guinea	.206	Uganda	.099	169	Chad	-.867		Bangladesh	-.1.227	Bermuda	-.1.713

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78	Jamaica	-.243	Malaysia	.187	Lesotho	.087	170	Comoros	-.884	Syrian Arab Republic	-1.245	Cayman Islands	-1.716
79	Bolivia	-.255	Sao Tome and Principe	.183	Tanzania	.086	171	Micronesia Fed. Sts	-.924	Sudan	-1.288	Tuvalu	-1.731
80	Bahamas The	-.258	Nicaragua	.138	Cambodia	.072	172	Virgin Islands (U.S.)	-.928	Chad	-1.310	Greenland	-1.767
81	Cabon	-.263	Bhutan	.136	Senegal	.071	173	American Samoa	-.946	Iraq	-1.356	Faeroe Islands	-1.931
82	Chana	-.273	Paraguay	.114	Mozambique	.070	174	Tuvalu	-.959	Guinea	-1.381	Curacao	-2.023
83	Guatemala	-.282	Dominican Republic	.066	Ghana	.059	175	Turks and Caicos Islands	-.971	Cote d'Ivoire	-1.382	French Polynesia	-2.067
84	Senegal	-.296	Moldova	.066	Zambia	.050	176	Kiribati	-.972	Zimbabwe	-1.400	Turks and Caicos Islands	-2.079
85	Zambia	-.326	Honduras	.053	Mongolia	.045	177	Somalia	-.974	Afghanistan	-1.421	Sint-Maarten (Dutch part)	-2.117
86	Honduras	-.327	Belarus	.026	Uzbekistan	.034	178	French Polynesia	-1.011	Pakistan	-1.520	Virgin Islands (U.S.)	-2.145
87	El Salvador	-.335	Georgia	.024	Cameroon	.029	179	Curacao	-1.017	Congo Dem. Rep.	-1.520	American Samoa	-2.217
88	Tanzania	-.341	Maldives	.006	Trinidad and Tobago	.019	180	Northern Mariana Islands	-1.029	Ethiopia	-1.527	Northern Mariana Islands	-2.285
89	Paraguay	-.347	Armenia	-.010	Papua New Guinea	.010	181	Sint Maarten (Dutch part)	-1.037	Nigeria	-2.117	Guam	-2.335
90	Ethiopia	-.364	Fiji	-.011	Zimbabwe	-.035	182	South Sudan	-1.048	India	-2.403	China	-2.960
91	Mongolia	-.368	Lesotho	-.051	Sudan	-.040	183	Eritrea	-1.050	Russian Federation	-2.688	United States	-2.984
92	Nicaragua	-.370	Japan	-.051	Bahrain	-.061	184	Guam	-1.051	China	-3.160	Japan	-3.234

Sources: Own calculations on the basis of SPSS.

EU's official strategic partners 'Special 10'

EU's official strategic partner and member of the EEU

EEU's Members

